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CHAPTER 3
Global value chains and employment 
in developing economies
Claire H. Hollweg (World Bank Group)
ABSTRACT
The emergence of global value chains – whereby goods that 
used to be produced within one country are now fragmented 
and distributed across global networks of production – has 
offered developing countries new opportunities to integrate 
into the global economy. This has also had fundamental 
impacts for workers in developing countries. The chapter 
shows that higher earnings and employment within sectors 
and firms is associated with GVC integration, which also sup-
ports other spillovers that operate through labor markets. 
But it has also had distributional implications of where jobs 
go and the types of jobs they are. Jobs growth has occurred 
directly in the export sector, as well as indirectly through 
linkages of exporting firms to domestic, input-supplying 
firms. Employment creation and wage gains have been 
biased towards more skilled workers in developing countries, 
which contrasts with the predictions of trade theory. The 
skill-biased nature of GVC trade is associated with increased 
complexity of global supply chains as well as increased use 
of skill-intensive inputs, notably services. New emerging 
trends, including automation and digitization, may further 
determine how employment in developing countries will be 
affected by GVC trade in the future. The findings point to 
education as well as trade and labor policies as important 
factors for strengthening the GVC-labor relationship.
• The emergence of GVCs has offered developing countries opportunities to integrate into the 
global economy, which has had a significant impact on jobs and income in GVC sectors and firms. 
Integration can have additional benefits for the wider economy as most jobs are generated through 
upstream domestic supply chains. 
• Across the developing world, demand for skilled labor is rising. GVCs reinforce this trend by 
supporting more complex industrial organization and by relying on complementary skill-intensive 
services inputs.
• The impacts of technological change and increased productivity on employment linked to GVCs 
have been offset by growing consumer demand.
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1. Introduction
The emergence of global value chains – whereby goods that used to be produced within one country are now fragmented and distributed across global networks of production – has offered developing countries new 
opportunities to integrate into the global economy. Countries no 
longer need to develop entire industries to export; firms instead 
can access global markets by specializing in specific products or 
tasks within a value chain. Today, significant parts of the devel-
oping world are deeply involved in GVCs, with developing coun-
tries’ share in global GVC trade estimated at about 33 percent in 
2011 (Kummritz and Quast 2017).
Though powered by new technologies, the economic incen-
tives for GVC trade were largely driven by access to lower-cost 
labor. Offshoring happened initially in assembly activities in 
light manufacturing, but GVCs have since expanded to agricul-
tural and services sectors, as well as higher technology and more 
knowledge intensive manufacturing industries. This unbundling 
of production is expected to have implications for labor markets 
– where jobs go, who gets them, and what type of jobs they are 
(Farole 2015). 
There are reasons to expect that the nationwide employment 
effects of GVC integration are different in developing than in 
developed countries. For example, workers in developing coun-
tries often participate in different segments and tasks within 
GVCs than do workers in developed countries. Similarly, the 
introduction of new technologies may impact the GVC partici-
pation of developed and developing countries differently. GVCs 
are a channel for the transmission of new technologies from 
developed to developing countries, which could also result in 
additional spillover effects of participation in terms of learning. 
Trade is also shown to increase the demand for skills, but the 
implications for workers may be different in developing countries 
that are abundant in unskilled labor and tend to participate in 
lower-skilled segments of value chains.
This chapter focuses on the nationwide implications of GVC 
integration for workers in developing countries, in terms of jobs 
and wages, sector of employment, and skills. It also explores 
technological change from the perspective of GVCs and its impli-
cation for jobs and skills going forward. The chapter considers 
that GVC trade may not have the same effects on developing 
countries as non-GVC trade does, and takes a GVC focus when 
looking at these impacts. In doing so, it addresses four poli-
cy-relevant questions.
First, how do GVCs impact jobs and earnings in developing 
countries? Supporting better jobs and higher wages are a pri-
mary policy objective, which necessitates an understanding 
of the relationship between GVC participation and these labor 
market outcomes.
Second, does GVC trade have other development impacts 
on workers? There is a large literature showing that export-
ing and importing raise productivity. Many of these impacts 
happen through labor markets, for example through learning 
and technology dissemination. Whether and how these spillovers 
occur through GVC trade is important for policy.
Third, is GVC trade associated with increased demand for 
skilled labor in developing countries? And if so, through what 
channels? The factor-endowment theory of trade predicts that 
trade will reduce returns to unskilled labor in advanced econo-
mies while raising returns to capital and skilled labor. However, 
the developing world shows rising relative demand for skilled 
labor, similar to advanced economies. Whether these trends are 
associated with GVC participation is important to understanding 
the implications of GVCs for workers.
Fourth, how are technological advancements within GVC 
trade affecting jobs and skills in developing countries? New 
technologies are transforming the production process and alter-
ing our world of work (Hallward-Driemeier and Nayyar 2017), and 
many policy makers are deeply concerned about the impact of 
automation on assembly jobs in important GVC sectors.
The chapter shows that GVC integration has supported jobs 
and earnings, as well as other spillovers that operate through 
labor markets. Job and wage gains have been achieved not only 
within the exporting sector, but indirectly through linkages of 
exporting firms to domestic, input-supplying firms. However, 
GVC expansion in developing countries is also associated with 
higher relative demand for skilled workers. The chapter illus-
trates that characteristics of GVCs themselves, by supporting 
more complex industrial organization, as well as services inputs 
that are complementary to value chains, can be skill-biased.
The chapter also shows that technological advancements that 
largely get diffused through global value chains are affecting 
how GVCs support jobs in developing countries. Evidence sug-
gests that changes in efficiency in GVCs has negative impacts 
on employment linked to countries’ participation in the global 
production of products, all else equal. Technological innovation 
has also lowered the demand for low-skilled workers relatively 
more than compared to high-skilled workers. Nevertheless, the 
adverse effects of changing production technologies and effi-
ciencies on employment have been offset by increased con-
sumer demand, whereby the domestic consumption expendi-
tures in large emerging economies such as China and India will 
generate new demand for labor for the global economy.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 surveys the empir-
ical literature linking GVC participation to nationwide job and 
wage trends in developing countries. Section 3 discusses other 
spillovers resulting from features specific to GVCs that operate 
through countries’ labor markets. The potential links between 
GVC participation and the relative demand for skilled labor in 
developing countries are examined in Section 4, including spe-
cific features of GVCs that could be behind this trend. Section 
5 analyzes the potential implications of new technologies for 
GVCs from the perspective of labor markets. Section 6 identi-
fies policy considerations for developing countries to achieve 
better labor-market outcomes from GVC participation. Section 
7 concludes.
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2. GVCs and nationwide jobs and earnings in 
developing economies
A first step in analyzing the employment impact of GVCs on 
developing countries should consider not only the direct impact 
on jobs and wages, but also the nationwide implications for 
workers across sectors of the economy.
How do GVCs impact jobs and earnings in developing coun-
tries? While there is a decades-long catalogue of literature on 
the labor market impact of trade, the literature on the relation-
ship between GVCs and labor market outcomes is more nascent, 
though growing. Empirical studies are often limited to individual 
country studies and have focused mainly on high-income coun-
tries, although some contributions have focused on developing 
countries.
Meng, Xiao, and Ye (2018) use a GVC-based structure decom-
position analysis to identify determinant factors associated with 
the change in employment at the country level. Their decom-
position is based on the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) 
at constant prices for the period of 2002-2007, 2007-2009, and 
2009-2014. The objective is to better understand how GVCs 
affect employment at the country level.
Using the structural decomposition methodology, the change 
in employment between two different points of time can be 
explained by several factors, such as the change in domestic final 
demand, domestic production technology, exports and imports. 
In addition, this tool can be used to measure how much of the 
change in employment is caused by each of these factors. Unlike 
previous work, this chapter follows the approach used in Wang et 
al. (2017) to explicitly separate the impact of international trade 
into that related to traditional trade, simple GVCs and complex 
GVCs. This not only helps identify how changes in GVC participa-
tion affect employment, but also helps measure how other fac-
tors impact employment via various GVC routes.
In the model, a change in a country’s employment is decom-
posed into the change in labor productivity, the change in GVC 
production networks (further explained by the change in pure 
domestic value chains, simple GVCs, and complex GVCs), and 
the change in final demand (further explained by the change in 
the level of final demand, the change in household / government 
/ investment preferences, and the change in the structure of 
domestic expenditure). The results are presented in Figure 3.1 
for the most recent period 2009 to 2014 for selected countries 
including China, India, the United States, Germany and Japan. 
FIGURE 3.1 Decomposition of the change of a country’s labor between 2009 and 2014
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For each country, the figure plots the percentage change in jobs 
due to each of the separate effects, holding all else equal. Sum-
ming across all effects gives the total percent change in jobs at 
the country level.
Increased participation in GVCs – especially in complex GVCs 
whereby cross-border transactions happen more than twice – is 
associated with employment increases in all five countries. How-
ever, the positive impacts from increased participation in complex 
GVCs from 2009 to 2014 are getting smaller compared to the ear-
lier periods analyzed in Meng, Xiao and Ye (2018). The impact of 
the change in simple GVCs is no longer positive for all countries, as 
it had previously been. Thus, the role played by GVCs in increasing 
employment has fallen since 2002-2007 and 2007-2009. The most 
important factors for employment growth are increases in domes-
tic and foreign final demand, while labor productivity (output per 
worker) is the most important factor associated with reduced 
employment.
Other literature confirms the positive association between GVC 
participation and employment growth. The 2016 World Bank book 
Stitches to Riches (Lopez-Acevedo and Robertson, 2016) shows, 
based on data on the apparel sector in South Asia between 2000 
and 2010, that when a country experiences a 1 percent increase 
in apparel output (which is used as a proxy for apparel exports), 
there is a 0.3-0.4 percent increase in employment. This increased 
overall welfare as workers moved out of agriculture or the infor-
mal sector toward these better paying, higher value-added jobs. 
Shingal (2015) summarizes case studies on Vietnamese and Ban-
gladeshi garments, Vietnamese and South African textiles, and 
Kenyan and South African horticulture. Overall, these case studies 
show that GVC-participation is welfare improving, in the sense that 
it provides opportunities for employment and income gains.
Shepherd and Stone (2012) empirically test the relationship 
between labor outcomes and GVC participation using a cross-sec-
tion of firm-level data for OECD and emerging economies of Brazil, 
India, Indonesia, China and South Africa and fixed effect regres-
sions. They show that firms with the strongest international link-
ages, i.e. that import, export, and are foreign-owned, which serves 
as a proxy for GVC participation, show the highest employment 
levels. The positive effects of internationalization on labor demand 
is stronger for emerging markets than for OECD countries. Shep-
herd and Stone (2012) also find that firms with the strongest inter-
national linkages pay higher wages.
The relationship between GVC integration and level of employ-
ment is not necessarily positive in all contexts. Imports of goods 
and services (backward GVC participation) matter as much as 
exports of intermediates (forward GVC participation) to be success-
ful in GVCs, where opening up to imports is often a pre-condition 
to successfully export. However, there may be import-competing 
effects in labor markets. In the case of India, Banga (2016) examines 
the industry-level impact of participation in GVCs on employment 
during 1995-2011. Using fixed effects and GMM estimation tech-
niques, the author analyzes how increasing foreign value added in 
output, foreign value added in exports, and domestic value added 
in exports of intermediate goods can affect employment growth. 
The results reveal that higher backward linkages have negatively 
influenced employment growth in India, more so in the non-man-
ufacturing industries. However, higher forward linkages did not 
have any significant impact on employment.
Evidence as well as intuition suggests that GVC participation 
will have other distributional implications with respect to where 
jobs go, the types of jobs they are, and who gets them. For 
example, GVC participation has also had important implications 
for gender outcomes (see Box 3.1). Shepherd and Stone (2012) 
find that firms with international linkages hire a larger share of 
female workers, providing evidence that international linkages 
provide greater opportunities for women to enter the formal 
labor market. Women who previously had difficulty accessing 
this type of wage work have filled many of these jobs (Barrientos, 
Gereffi, and Rossi 2010).
Employment and wage growth can happen both directly 
within exporting firms as well as indirectly through these firms’ 
demand for goods and services from the domestic economy, 
suggesting other distributional consequences. The extent to 
which GVCs interact with domestic labor thus depends on the 
linkages of exporting firms to domestic, input-supplying firms. 
Viet Nam is an example of a country that has benefitted greatly 
from trade opportunities, where exports support jobs both 
directly and indirectly (see Box 3.2).
The type of jobs also depends on the type of activities under-
taken by firms within value chains, which also matters for GVCs 
development impact. As noted by Shephard and Stone (2012), 
the labor market impacts of assembly operations, which are rel-
atively low wage and low skill, are different from those of more 
high technology production processes, which tend to be associ-
ated with stronger relative demand for skilled labor and higher 
relative wages. For example, the boom in exports to the United 
States following the US–Viet Nam Bilateral Trade Agreement 
of 2001 was particularly beneficial to wages of unskilled work-
ers, reduced the skill premium, and was a key driver of poverty 
reduction in Viet Nam because it was concentrated in unskilled, 
labor-intensive GVC sectors, most notably textiles (Fukase 2013; 
McCaig 2011).
3. GVCs and nationwide spillovers through 
labor markets
Are there other development impacts for workers of GVC trade? 
The opportunity for GVCs to impact labor markets goes beyond 
their direct and indirect impact on jobs and wages. There exists 
a large literature on spillover effects of learning by exporting as 
well as learning by importing. To the extent that GVC participa-
tion supports domestic firms in developing countries to import 
and export, this can be a key channel by which GVC participation 
supports spillovers.
First, this can happen through access to information and open 
markets (Shepherd and Stone 2012), or by importing inputs that 
contain knowledge and technology. The governance structure 
of GVC relationships between lead firms and suppliers suggest 
additional mechanisms for knowledge spillovers. Buyers and 
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BOX 3.1
GVCs and gender outcomes
Evidence shows that women take on a larger share of jobs in 
labor-intensive value chains than do men. In sectors most 
intensively traded in GVCs – such as apparel, footwear, and 
electronics – lower-skilled, young, female workers account for 
the largest share of employment. In the Kenyan and Ugandan 
floriculture GVCs, women represent 65-75 percent of the labor 
force, working mostly in packhouses that offer higher incomes 
than on-farm labor does. In the apparel sector globally, women 
are a majority of the workforce. For example, in Turkey, two 
million of the three million workers in this sector in 2008 were 
women. In Bangladesh, approximately 80 percent of the gar-
ment workers in the same year were women (Kumar 2017).
Yet global value chain participation does not necessarily lead 
to gender equality. Gender inequalities in GVC participation can 
manifest in a number of ways and for a number of reasons. For 
example, there is gender segregation both across and within 
sectors. Women workers are more likely to be located in lower 
value-added components of value chains, are paid less than men, 
and are more likely to face problematic working conditions. The 
benefits of women’s participation in GVCs largely reflect greater 
numbers of jobs rather than opportunities to work in higher-pay-
ing jobs within a sector (Bamber and Staritz 2016).
The disadvantages women often face in endowments, 
including assets, education, experience, and social capital, make 
it difficult for them to access the better jobs resulting from par-
ticipation in GVCs. This was found to be the case in call centers 
in Egypt, where limited access to education, training, promotion 
and networks made it difficult for women to take advantage of 
the rising demand for higher technical skills generated by prod-
uct upgrading (Ahmed 2013). These gender-intensified con-
straints can restrict a country’s ability to remain competitive and 
upgrade to higher-value segments of the chain.
BOX 3.2
Labor content of Viet Nam’s exports1
Exports have become increasingly important for jobs in Viet 
Nam. Following the methodology of Calì et al. (2016), Holl-
weg (2017) computes the jobs content of Viet Nam’s exports 
using a panel of Viet Nam’s input-output tables between 
1989 and 2012, matched with sectoral employment data 
from Viet Nam’s statistical yearbook. The calculations yield a 
set of linkages, both direct and indirect, across sectors of the 
number of jobs employed in export production. From 1989 
to 2012, the total number of jobs supported by Viet Nam’s 
exports – taking into account both the direct and indirect 
jobs – increased from 5.3 million to 20.5 million, or from less 
than 1 in 5 jobs to more than 2 in 5 (19% employed directly 
by exports and another 21% of the workforce indirectly). 
The manufacturing sector dominates the number of jobs 
in exports. In 2012, manufacturing exports supported 11.8 
million jobs, or 58 percent of total export jobs, more than a 
12-fold increase since 1989. However, most of these export 
jobs are indirect—about 71 percent in 2012.
FIGURE 3.2 Direct, indirect (backward) and total jobs content of exports, total (left) and across sectors (right)
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BOX 3.3
China’s import penetration in developed vs. developing countries
What has been the impact of increasing imports of Chinese 
intermediate goods, including on labor markets, in other 
countries? Increased availability of Chinese goods and 
services is argued to have put pressure on employment in 
import-competing sectors in other countries. Autor, Dorn, 
and Hanson (2013) and Acemoglu et al. (2016) have shown 
a negative employment effect from Chinese import pene-
tration. Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006), Mion and Zhu 
(2013) and Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2016) also show 
import competition effects on firm employment, survival, 
technology and innovation.
In the context of shared international production, how-
ever, cheaper intermediate goods from China may also offer 
some countries competitive opportunities. Boffa, Santoni, 
and Taglioni (2018) quantify the impact of China’s increased 
import penetration of intermediate goods in terms of output 
and value added of partner countries. The authors build a 
trade-weighted measure of China’s import penetration, 
and empirically relate it with the growth rate of output and 
value added in partner countries. Since countries’ imports 
from China depend on their own domestic production struc-
ture, this relationship may be endogenous. To overcome this 
endogeneity, Boffa, Santoni, and Taglioni (2018) instrument 
China’s import penetration with the weighted average Chi-
nese intermediate import penetration in all trade partners. 
Rather than using trade weights (which may also be endog- 
enous), an orthogonal set of weights are constructed using 
a gravity-model specification to predict cross-country inter-
mediate flows based on bilateral exogenous determinants.
The authors show that China’s import penetration shock 
matters for output and value added in trading partners, but 
with differing effects across income groups with winners 
and losers (Figure 3.3). For high-income countries, higher 
import penetration of Chinese goods is associated with 
declines in gross output and value added. However, upper 
middle-income countries appear to have benefitted through 
deepening trade integration with China, where higher 
import penetration is associated with higher growth in 
gross output as well as value added. For low-income coun-
tries, the results are inconclusive, as there is no relationship 
once additional controls are added. Overall, China’s market 
penetration has been an opportunity, rather than a threat, 
for some developing economies.
The degree of complementarity or substitution of 
domestic production with China’s imports is one factor 
potentially driving these varying results. If production struc-
tures are substitutes, Chinese import penetration may dis-
place local producers. On the other hand, China’s trading 
partners may benefit in terms of value added and output if 
their production structures are complementary to China’s. 
China requires inputs for its own production, which may 
stimulate foreign supply due to interregional linkages.
FIGURE 3.3 Estimated effect of China import penetration on gross output and value added
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suppliers exchange not only goods and services, but also know-
how and technology. Based on qualitative data, Gyeke-Dako et 
al. (2017) find that firms that are inserted into GVCs in Ghana, 
whereby governance structures are characterized by lead firms, 
are more likely to have employment strategies that improve the 
quality of employment compared with firms that do not have 
links with lead firms. Learnings effects and feedback loops in 
tacit knowledge also occurs from using more sophisticated tech-
nology (MacGarvie, 2006). Similarly, there exist self-reinforcing 
complementarities between importing and innovation capabili-
ties (Boeler, Moxnes, and Ulltveit-Moe, 2015).
Second, employer-sponsored training within GVCs can also 
be an effective mechanism for skills development. In Cambodia, 
exporters and foreign firms have a higher incidence of provid-
ing training to workers than non-exporters or domestic firms. A 
2012 Employer Skills Needs Survey undertaken by the ILO and 
National Employment Agency (NEA) have information on train-
ing by ownership (foreign, Cambodian), and main market (inter-
national, national, local). Nearly three quarters of foreign firms 
and export firms provide training to workers, compared to 57 
percent of domestic firms and 61 percent of firms that service the 
national market. 
Third, better working conditions may also result from GVC 
participation, as governments seek to comply with buyers’ stan-
dards on health, safety and treatment of workers. Where GVC 
employment generates better rights and protection for workers, 
it can enhance social upgrading. But often this employment is 
insecure and unprotected, and there are significant challenges 
ensuring decent work and pay for more vulnerable workers. The 
downward pricing pressure found in many GVCs has simultane-
ously led to negative social impacts. However, these outcomes 
do not necessarily occur automatically, and policies can support 
better working conditions (discussed below).
Fourth, growth and productivity spillovers can also material-
ize for developing countries that participate in GVCs. For exam-
ple, access to cheaper or more diversified varieties and comple-
mentarities between imported inputs and domestic products 
leads to gains in scope and productivity, which is found to matter 
more than direct benefits from lower prices or higher quality of 
foreign inputs (Goldberg et al., 2010; Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl, 
2015). Boffa, Santoni and Taglioni (2018) show that the increased 
supply of intermediate products by China has had output and 
value added gains for middle-income countries (see Box 3.3).
4. GVCs and the relative demand for skilled 
labor
The hallmark of globalization is big developing countries open-
ing up and joining global trade. In general, such economies are 
abundant in unskilled labor and scarce in skilled labor and capi-
tal relative to global averages. The factor-endowment theory of 
trade predicts that trade will reduce returns to unskilled labor 
in advanced economies while raising returns to capital and 
skilled labor. This trend has generally been observed. But the 
opposite trend should occur in developing countries that open 
up: wages of unskilled workers, clearly the most abundant factor 
in many developing countries, should rise faster than other factor 
rewards. This has not happened in most developing countries; 
rather, employment creation and wage gains have been biased 
towards more skilled workers.
Is GVC trade associated with increased demand for skilled 
labor in developing countries? And if so, through what channels? 
A recent paper by Farole, Hollweg, and Winkler (2018) focuses 
on two specific patterns of GVC integration – backward (or ‘buy-
ing-side’) and forward (or ‘selling-side’) – to empirically relate 
changes in GVC integration to changes in the relative demand 
for skilled labor. 
Forward integration is defined by the incorporation of a 
firm’s exports in the production of exports by a third country, in 
other words, supplying intermediate inputs for other countries’ 
exports. For example, the Czech Republic may produce exhaust 
systems that are incorporated into an automobile produced in 
Germany, or Malaysia may produce microchips that are included 
in US-developed iPhone manufactured in China. This is often 
measured at the country-sector level in terms of overall levels 
(domestic value added embodied in third-country exports) and 
in terms of intensity (share of domestic value added embodied in 
third-country exports).
Backward integration is defined by the use of foreign inputs 
in production that is exported; in other words, buying foreign 
inputs in order to export. For example, Bangladesh may import 
textile fabric produced in Pakistan that is used to make clothing 
exported by Bangladesh. This is often measured at the coun-
try-sector level in terms of overall levels (foreign value added 
in exports) and in terms of intensity (foreign share of total value 
added in exports).
Farole, Hollweg, and Winkler (2018) use data from the World 
Bank’s Labor Content of Exports (LACEX) database of 57 sec-
tors for the years 2001, 2004, 2007, 2011, and 2014 and about 
120 countries. The database uses input-output data from the 
Global Trade Analysis Project to measure the direct and indirect 
wages paid to produce exports by worker type. The labor market 
outcome is the relative demand for skilled labor (measured as 
wages paid to produce exports to skilled versus unskilled labor). 
It includes both the direct wages paid to workers in the export-
ing sector, as well as the indirect wages paid to workers supply-
ing domestic inputs to exports. The authors regress the labor 
market outcome on the log of the measure of GVC participation 
controlling for log of output at the country, sector and year level 
as well as country-sector, sector-year, and country-year fixed 
effects. The authors then interact the trade measure with a series 
of dummy variables that take the value of 1 to reflect country 
income level (high income, upper middle income, lower middle 
income, low income) and 0 if not, to detect the joint effect for 
that dummy of interest.
The estimated coefficient on the measure of GVC partici-
pation is presented in Figure 3.4. The authors find that greater 
returns to skilled labor is correlated with GVC expansion on the 
buying side. This holds across all income categories, in particular 
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high- and low-income countries, resulting in a U-shaped effect. 
The strong correlation in low-income countries runs counter to 
the discourse that GVC integration leads to specialization based 
on comparative advantage, which would presumably result in an 
increased demand for unskilled (low wage) labor in these coun-
tries. The positive skill-biased affect associated with GVC partic-
ipation as a buyer happens primarily in input-supplying sectors, 
with lower relative demand for skills directly in the exporting 
sectors. The authors find no correlation in the overall sample 
between GVC participation as a seller and the relative demand 
for skilled labor. However, high income countries show a positive 
relationship.
Firm-level analysis also confirms a positive and significant rela-
tionship between GVCs and skilled labor. Shepherd and Stone 
(2012) find a positive and significant relationship between the 
number of skilled workers and firms with international linkages 
(that import, export, and are foreign owned). Applying propen-
sity score matching techniques to firm-level data in a sample of 
27 transition economies, Crinò (2012) find that importing inputs 
increases the relative demand for skilled labor. Specifically, it 
explains more than one quarter of the unconditional difference 
between importers and non-importers in the employment share 
of high skill workers.
Recent theories point out several channels through which 
trade can lead to an increasing demand for skills. For instance, an 
increase in the relative demand for high-skill workers can come 
from a trade-induced change in the firm composition. When 
trade liberalization opens new trading opportunities, the most 
productive firms try to seize them and expand their production. 
At the same time, international trade stiffens competition in the 
domestic market, leading the least efficient firms to reduce their 
sales or close down. High-productivity expanding firms tend to 
be more skill-intensive than low-productivity downsizing firms, 
and therefore this change in firm composition may translate into 
an increase in the relative demand for high-skill workers irre-
spective of the industry specialization (Helpman, Itskhoki, and 
Redding 2010). In addition, trade may increase the rewards for 
skill-biased technical change which further raises skill demand 
(Bustos 2011). Some studies attribute the labor demand bias 
against less-educated workers to both GVC participation and 
technological progress (discussed below).
This chapter explores three additional channels specific to 
GVC trade: (1) the importance of services for GVC trade, (2) the 
increased complexity of industrial organization in GVC trade, 
and (3) the skills composition of different activities performed 
within GVCs.
GVCs and services inputs
The emergence of GVCs has been accompanied by important 
changes in the services sector, where services have become crit-
ical for countries’ trade, including participation and upgrading 
in global value chains. Services play a dual role—as inputs into 
manufacturing and agriculture value chains and as value chains of 
their own. Much of the value of manufactured goods comes from 
inputs of services industries; some studies estimate that services 
account for 40 percent of the value added of world trade (Lanz 
and Maurer 2015).
Differences in skills intensity across sectors mean distribu-
tional implications of GVC participation on labor markets when 
GVC participation changes the relative demand for inputs 
across more- or less-skill intensive sectors. For example, ser-
vices jobs are needed to manage the complexity of the supply 
chain and preserve production throughout the chain. Exam-
ples include management, financial services, telecommunica-
tions, and other services such as auditors and lawyers (Tagli-
oni and Winkler, 2016), which tend to be more skill intensive.
FIGURE 3.4 Relationship between relative demand for skilled labor and GVC participation
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Calì and Hollweg (2017) show for South Africa that enhanced 
GVC participation in GVC-intensive sectors had distributional 
implications for skilled versus unskilled labor. Using the World 
Bank Labor Content of Exports database, the authors measure 
the direct and indirect labor content embodied within South Afri-
ca’s exports between 2001 and 2011. They find that enhanced 
GVC participation in automotives and wearing apparel was asso-
ciated with a decline in the relative demand for skilled labor 
directly employed in these GVC sectors, and an increase in the 
relative demand for skilled labor indirectly employed in sectors 
that produce inputs for GVC sectors, in particular services sectors. 
Other literature confirms that GVC integration entails the use 
of upstream inputs that are not only more labor intensive than 
non-GVC exports, but also more skills intensive, as non-GVC 
exports rely on relatively more commodified upstream inputs 
(Farole and Pathikonda, 2017; Taglioni and Winkler, 2016). A case 
study of the impact of the Japanese Multinational Company 
on skilled labor in Malaysia shows that the integration of the 
subsidiary’s production network into its GVC spurred increas-
ing needs for skill development, particularly in management 
and engineering services (Iberahim 2013). Fernandez-Stark, 
Bamber, and Gereffi (2010) show that the Chilean offshore ser-
vices sector typically employs more skilled workers than other 
sectors: employees are typically younger, more likely to be 
male, and hold some level of tertiary education, most often 
from a technical education institution rather than a university.
GVCs and complex industrial organization
A recent study by Kidder and Dollar (2018) shows that GVC inte-
gration can be biased towards more skilled workers in devel-
oping countries. This happens because (i) GVCs are associated 
with more complex industrial organization, and (ii) more complex 
industrial organization is associated with more skilled labor in 
countries that export in GVCs.
First, Kidder and Dollar (2018) construct an average mea-
sure of the value chain length, proposed by Wang et al. (2017), 
as a measure of complex industrial organization. That is, indus-
tries with longer value chains are considered to be more com-
plex. The measure is the weighted average number of produc-
tion processes within the chain, starting from the product – for 
example, machinery – to the product’s raw inputs – for example, 
metal. The authors use global input-output data for 2008 from 
the World Input-Output Database. They also consider the length 
of the domestic portion of the value chain. Value chain length 
serves as an indication of how complex the production process 
has become.
The authors find a positive association between firms’ sourc-
ing decisions of foreign intermediate inputs and the foreign mar-
ket’s value chain length. That is, trading partners are more likely 
to import intermediate products from country-industries that 
have longer value chains. As an example, Figure 3.5 shows the 
destinations in which the manufacturing sectors in Mexico, China, 
Germany and the United States are sourcing their machinery. On 
the x-axis is the domestic value chain length of the source coun-
try. On the y-axis is the log of the share of foreign intermediates 
from the source country as a share of total foreign intermediates 
(i.e. the import share) in Mexico, China, Germany and the United 
States. There is a clear positive association between the domes-
tic value chain length of the supplier and the import share from 
that supplier. Moreover, the strength of this correlation varies 
across levels of economic development; the correlation is stron-
ger when the seller is from a high-income country. In sum, buyers 
import more from partners who have longer domestic value 
chains for all levels of development, but longer supply chains are 
more strongly correlated for high-income sellers.
What could drive this association? Buyers may prefer to estab-
lish relationships with suppliers that have longer value chains, 
as a way to reduce the transaction costs in international trade. 
External transaction costs are high in international trade, and 
they are incurred at both the product level as well as the trading 
partner level. At the trading partner level, these transaction costs 
could include asymmetric information problems, language barri-
ers, cultural differences, unfamiliar foreign contractual enforce-
ment institutions, among others. Longer value chains within the 
supplier therefore reduces transaction costs for the importer.
Second, Kidder and Dollar (2018) empirically test the relation-
ship between domestic value chain length and the skill composi-
tion of the labor force, to determine to what extent lengthening 
of the value chain might be capable of explaining patterns in the 
distribution of skills. They regress the share of skilled labor in a 
country, industry and year on the upstream global value chain 
length of the industry, as well as other control variables for 2000-
2008, and find a positive correlation between higher skills and 
longer global value chains (skills are concentrated in sectors with 
longer value chain length). To identify the direction of causality 
of this relationship, the authors then use an instrumental vari-
ables approach by instrumenting value chain length with China’s 
trade liberalization, treated as an exogenous “China-shock”.
China is used as an exogenous shock to global value chain 
length of Chinese trading partners who are downstream of Chi-
nese production. Imports into China are influenced by Chinese 
import tariffs. The impact of reducing import tariffs on partner 
countries’ value chain length will vary with the inherent tradabil-
ity of sectors, as well as the distance to China. Kee and Tang 
(2015) show that the reduction in costs due to lower import tar-
iffs led Chinese manufactures to substitute out of foreign goods 
and into domestic varieties. This in turn increased the value chain 
length of Chinese goods, which increases the global value chain 
length of trade partners who import intermediates from China. 
Thus, the import tariff reduction had a direct impact on both the 
Chinese domestic and Chinese global value chains. By interact-
ing the Chinese tariffs with measures of tradability and distance, 
Kidder and Dollar (2018) come up with an instrument for value 
chain length that varies across sectors and trading partners. The 
authors show that the instrument is a good predictor of trading 
partners’ imports of intermediate products from China.
Kidder and Dollar (2018) find that value chain length itself 
affects the skills composition of the work force. In developed 
economies, there are strong positive effects on high-skilled 
labor, as well as moderate positive effects on medium-skilled 
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labor. In developing economies, the results are a modest pos-
itive effect on both high and medium skills. The low-skill labor 
share is negatively affected by value chain length in both devel-
oped and developing countries.
The results are consistent with the idea that expansion of GVCs 
modified the usual effects of trade on the demand for factors. 
Services are the likely mechanism at play, as discussed above. 
First, skilled labor is needed to manage the value chain, in sectors 
like logistics and transport. Second, skilled labor is also needed 
in services inputs that are complementary to value chains, such as 
finance, telecommunications, and business services.
GVCs and upgrading
The changing nature of tasks and activities performed within value 
chains can also impact the relationship between GVC participation 
and the relative demand for skilled labor. For example, higher-value 
added activities such as research and development, design, brand-
ing, sourcing, and customer support that make up important com-
ponents of GVCs are also relatively more skill intensive.
China offers an interesting case study. Unlike the experience in 
other developing countries, China’s domestic value-added content 
in exports increased during the 2000s. Chen et al. (2018) analyze 
China’s domestic value added from activities in exports between 
2002 and 2012, to understand whether this increase reflects a 
movement up the value chain towards higher value-added, 
skill-intensive activities.
The authors analyze China’s domestic value added from the 
perspective of activities in exports between 2002 and 2012. 
The authors used occupational data as well as inter-provincial 
input-output tables to distinguish between four possible busi-
ness activities: R&D, fabrication, marketing, and other support 
services. The contribution of an activity is the wage income 
of workers that perform it, based on their occupation. Data is 
available for 42 industries in 31 provinces of China. A functional 
index of specialization (FS index) is constructed, which measures 
the relative specialization of a province for each of the possible 
business activities. A province is considered to have a relative 
specialization in the business activity if the FS index is above 1. 
FIGURE 3.5 Source destination and value chain length
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Figure 3.6 plots the FS index against provincial GDP per capita 
in 2012.
Findings suggest that the increase in China’s domestic value 
added in exports arose from an expansion of fabrication activ-
ities in provinces such as Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang. 
Moreover, there is a negative relationship between specializa-
tion in fabrication activities and the GDP per capita of Chinese 
provinces (bottom panel of Figure 3.6). However, there is a clear 
sub-national variation in domestic value added from activities in 
exports. Richer provinces increasingly specialized in higher value 
added activities including R&D and sales and marketing, partic-
ularly Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai (top and middle panels of 
Figure 3.6). The changing nature of global value chain activities 
that the economy performs therefore has skill implications.
5. GVCs, technological change, and labor 
markets
Technology is advancing rapidly, and innovations are increasingly 
disrupting production patterns around the world. Recent World 
Bank research shows that the increasing adoption of industrial 
automation, data exchange, advanced robotics, smart factories, 
the Internet of Things, and 3D printing – referred to as “Indus-
try 4.0”, or the fourth industrial revolution – are transforming 
the manufacturing process and altering our world of work (Hall-
ward-Driemeier and Nayyar 2017).
The introduction of these new technologies in production in 
developing countries often takes place through GVCs, where 
lead firms disseminate technology to their suppliers (Rodrik, 
2018). As discussed throughout this report, these technolog-
ical advancements are also shaping global value chains, and 
ultimately the domestic implications of GVC participation. Pol-
icymakers in many developing countries engaged in GVCs are 
concerned about the impact of Industry 4.0, such as automation 
and digitization, on manufacturing assembly jobs and skills, and 
ultimately the welfare of their citizens.
Innovation will always be disruptive, and for the most part, 
Industry 4.0 can bring new opportunities for developing coun-
tries to engage in and achieve the benefits of GVC participation. 
Digital technologies are reducing entry costs into manufactur-
ing by reducing the impact of distance. 3-D printing may lower 
transport costs, lessen the importance of achieving economies 
of scale for manufacturers, and make it easier to manufacture 
high-quality products. New technologies in the production pro-
cess can boost productivity, drive down costs, and support the 
speed of technological diffusion and catch-up. E-commerce 
platforms allow small-scale producers to sell goods directly to 
consumers, both domestically and for export. The information 
revolution has provided new opportunities for developing coun-
tries to go beyond traditional services exports, such as tourism 
and transport, to export modern services. Many ICT-enabled 
professional services – which can be developed without a man-
ufacturing core – can be exported electronically and also be a 
source of innovation or technology diffusion (Nayyar 2017).
FIGURE 3.6 Specialization by Chinese provinces and 
functions, 2012
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Industry 4.0 also poses risks for developing countries, many of 
which would be felt within labor markets. Looking ahead, to the 
degree that new technologies associated with Industry 4.0 may 
be labor-saving, the concern is that robotics will replace low-
skilled assembly jobs in developing countries. FoxConn recently 
replaced 60,000 Chinese factory workers with industrial robots 
(Wakefield 2016). In addition to being a risk of job loss for some 
countries, Industry 4.0 may also be one of missed opportunities 
for other countries. Robotics, 3-D printing, and other advances 
raise the possibility of “re-shoring” of routine activities from 
labor-abundant developing economies back to developed econ-
omies. For instance, there is a concern that the expected migra-
tion of labor-intensive activities from China to poorer economies 
with lower labor costs, such as those in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
might not happen; a re-shoring of manufacturing activity from 
developing back to developed countries may take place instead.
How are technological advancements within GVC trade 
affecting jobs and skills in developing countries? A recent study 
by Bertulfo, Gentile, and de Vries (2019) provides analytical evi-
dence on this question, focusing specifically on the impact of the 
acceleration of technological progress within GVCs on jobs. The 
authors apply a structural decomposition method to examine 
the drivers of the changes in GVC jobs in 12 developing Asian 
economies between 2005 and 2015 using regional input output 
tables and labor force survey data.2 GVC jobs are defined as the 
jobs in a country linked to participation in global production of 
a particular set of products (Timmer et al. 2014; Meng, Peters, 
and Wang 2015). GVC jobs are further disaggregated by skill 
type (low, medium, high skilled) and business activity (R&D, pro-
duction, logistics / sales / marketing, administration / back office, 
and headquarter workers).
The decomposition of the change of employment is presented 
in the top panel of Figure 3.7. The total change in employment 
in each economy can be separated into changes due to: (i) shifts 
within GVCs, resulting from changes within the production struc-
ture of the GVC of a specific final product; (ii) shifts between 
GVCs, resulting from changes in consumer demand for differ-
ent products; or (iii) shifts due to changes in global demand for 
goods and services, which is separated between domestic or 
foreign demand (ADB 2018). For example, if consumers increase 
their demand for services and lower their demand for manufac-
tured goods, then employment would rise in services sectors 
and decline in manufacturing (shifts between GVCs). And if 
income increases in either the domestic or foreign economies, 
then employment will rise to meet the higher demand for goods 
(shifts due to changes in demand driven by income growth).
Shifts within GVCs are further separated into: (i) technology 
within GVCs, or changes in employment associated with changes 
in efficiency within a specific GVC; (ii) task relocation, or changes 
in employment as the location changes for one or more produc-
tion tasks; and (iii) country-level efficiency, or changes in employ-
ment from efficiency changes in an economy that participates 
in GVCs (ADB 2018). Technological progress is measured as a 
change in the efficiency units of labor, which is determined by 
the technical production requirements in terms of intermediate 
inputs. Increased efficiency in a GVC will, ceteris paribus, lead 
to lower demand for jobs in a particular skill type or activity. For 
example, if machines replace workers in some of the produc-
tion tasks in the supply chain, then this will lower the number of 
GVC jobs, all else equal (technology within GVCs). On the other 
hand, if garment manufactures decide to outsource some jobs 
to another economy, then the number of jobs is unchanged, but 
fewer workers are employed in the outsourcing economy, and 
more in the receiving economy (task relocation). Efficiency is also 
allowed to vary across economies. If productivity in an economy 
catches up to the productivity leader then fewer jobs would also 
be needed to produce the same amount of output (country-level 
efficiency).
The results of the structural decomposition are presented in 
the bottom panel of Figure 3.7. For each economy, the figure 
plots the percentage change in GVC jobs due to each of the sep-
arate effects, holding all else equal. Summary across all effects 
give the total percent change in GVC jobs at the country level. 
The study finds that technology within GVCs, or changes in 
efficiency within a specific GVC, is associated with a decrease in 
the levels of employment across all sectors in developing Asia. 
For example, increases in efficiency would have reduced GVC 
jobs by about 50 percent in developing Asia, holding all else 
equal. The estimated effect is smaller in services than in agricul-
ture and manufacturing. Efficiency gains within economies has 
also negatively affected employment levels. For example, GVC 
jobs would have been lower by about 20 percent holding all else 
equal in developing Asia.
Nevertheless, the adverse effects of changing production 
technologies and efficiencies on employment have been offset 
by increased consumer demand. Demand for goods and ser-
vices from a new Asian middle class in particular has increased 
employment levels. In developing Asia, for example, the increase 
in employment associated with own-country income is 80 per-
cent, versus 8 per cent due to increased income from the rest of 
the world. The findings also suggest that the domestic consump-
tion expenditures in large emerging economies such as China 
and India will generate new demand for labor for the global 
economy. The impact on employment of task relocation between 
economies that participate in GVCs is smaller and mixed.
The interaction of GVC expansion and technological change 
has distributional consequences. The results of Bertulfo, Gen-
tile, and de Vries (2019) suggest that technological change in 
GVCs has been skill biased in developing Asian economies. 
The authors separate employment into routine and non-routine 
occupations, to understand how technology is impacting the 
skill profile of GVC-related jobs. Routine tasks include occupa-
tions such as craft and related trade workers, plant and machine 
operators, or clerical support workers. Nonroutine tasks include 
services and sales workers, managers, professionals, or techni-
cians. Job losses due to the implementation of technology along 
GVCs have been associated with a decline in both routine and 
nonroutine employment levels. However, the share of nonroutine 
(cognitive) employment has increased, meaning these types of 
occupations are becoming relatively more important in GVCs.
Global value chains and employment in developing economies • 75
Using a similar methodology and country coverage but for 
the periods 2000-2011, de Vries et al. (2016) look at changes in 
GVC jobs by business activities due to technological change. The 
results suggest that technological change within GVCs had a big 
effect on the relative demand for higher value added and more 
skill-intensive activities, such as R&D and headquarter jobs. For 
example, improvements in GVC technology lowered demand 
for production workers by about 55 million workers in China, 
but hardly affected demand for R&D jobs. This is suggestive 
evidence of technological change being to the benefit of more 
knowledge-intensive activities, as well as changing the sectoral 
profile. While automation will likely reduce the number of tradi-
tional manufacturing jobs, new service jobs will also be created 
within the chain. The skills required for workers in these positions 
is less industry-specific, and more related to learning the soft-
ware programs and basic computer skills (Frederick 2018).
Recent advances in automation have also sparked concerns 
over the impact on jobs within global value chains, particularly 
assembly. For example, a recent study by Chang et al. (2016) 
estimate that as many as 88% of Cambodian, 86% of Vietnam-
ese and 64% of Indonesian wage workers could face possible 
replacement by automation. Nevertheless, tradable goods such 
as textiles, garments, and footwear continue to be labor inten-
sive and do not feature much automation yet (Box 3.4).
6. Policy considerations for strengthening the 
labor-GVC relationship
The evidence above illustrates how integration and upgrading 
in GVCs has implications for labor markets in developing coun-
tries. Policy can support the relationship between labor and GVC 
FIGURE 3.7 Decomposing changes in labor demand
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participation in different ways. This chapter considers policies 
that (i) support participation of developing countries in GVCs, 
(ii) foster positive spillovers from GVC participation, (iii) induce 
upgrading to higher value added tasks within GVCs, and (iv) 
mediate negative effects, such as increased inequality.
First, to the extent the GVC participation supports better 
jobs and higher wages, policies that support developing coun-
tries to participate in GVCs can support these outcomes. Tagli-
oni and Winkler (2016) provide a thorough review of policies 
that can foster GVC participation of developing countries. Key 
BOX 3.4
Automation in the apparel value chain
Automation in the apparel industry is complex. Automat-
ing a production process typically occurs because: (1) it is 
expensive to hire people to do the job; (2) the product has 
the potential to be contaminated if handled; or (3) the task 
is repetitive with minimal changes. Apparel, particularly the 
sewing segment, does not meet these requirements. There 
has historically been a pool of low cost labor from a global 
perspective, contamination is not an issue, and whereas the 
task is repetitive, it changes often. For these reasons, there 
has been minimal demand to automate most parts of the 
apparel supply chain. 
Recent advances in automation have led to assessments 
that the apparel sector could be vulnerable to disruptive 
change. One report concludes that the broader textiles, 
clothing and footwear industry faced higher automation 
risks than workers in automotive and auto parts; electron-
ics and electrical parts; business process outsourcing; and 
retail value chains (Chang et al. 2016). ASEAN nations could 
be in a precarious situation, according to this analysis.
The first robotic, automated production line for apparel 
could be operational by the end of 2018 with larger-scale 
implementation further ahead (Stacey and Nicolaou, 2017). 
Softwear Automation produces a clothes-making robot 
called “Sewbot.” The system was being installed in a facil-
ity in the United States with the expectation of producing 
1.2 million t-shirts per year at a price that is competitive 
with manufacturing and shipping the same material in low-
wage locations (Peters, 2017). Large-volume buyers such as 
Walmart have expressed interest in the technology, part-
nering with Softwear on trial projects (Stacey and Nicolaou, 
2017). In the case of the Sewbot for t-shirts, its developers 
claim that one operator overseeing a t-shirt line can carry 
out the tasks of 10 operators in approximately half the 
time (Barrie, 2017). There have been similar advancements 
in related industries, such as footwear, in which companies 
such as Adidas have used computerized knitting technolo-
gies for shoe mesh at facilities in Europe and North America 
(Emont, 2018). In the longer-term, firms from other indus-
tries that have been more modular and automated for 
decades may also move into the apparel industry and bring 
production model knowledge that creates new oppor-
tunities for automation that have not yet been seriously 
considered. Flextronics is an example of a company in elec-
tronics that is now rapidly pursuing how to use their operat-
ing model in industries such as footwear.
There are, however, reasons to believe that the spread of 
automation in the apparel industry will not be widespread 
in the immediate future. The Sewbot is designed primarily 
for t-shirts with possible expansion to jeans. T-shirts are 
relatively simple to produce, with production consisting of 
13 separate tasks, from quality inspection to heat transfer 
to collar and label attachment to steaming and hemming. 
Jeans, on the other hand, involve some 30-40 operations, 
while a dress shirt with pockets has 78 steps, or six times 
the number of operations to make a t-shirt (Barrie, 2017). 
Moreover, Sewbot’s executives believe the technology is ill-
suited for more complex designs and concede that low-cost 
locations such as Bangladesh are likely to still have signifi-
cant competitive advantages (Bain, 2018; Peters, 2017).
Another limitation is that these machines are expensive 
and are often only purchased by multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) that serve global buyers from various destinations 
around the world. They do this to ensure products are 
the same and because their production volumes are high 
enough to warrant the capital expenditures.
A final critical element that makes robotic automation 
more difficult in apparel is the fact that fabrics are flexible 
(drape, soft). This makes them difficult to handle through 
automation because tension needs to be applied in various 
degrees depending on the desired aesthetics of the prod-
uct. The look and feel are key drivers of apparel purchasing, 
so if these important elements are compromised by auto-
mation, they are far less likely to be used. Similarly, given 
the high cost of investment, apparel manufacturers will be 
hesitant to purchase machinery until it is proven to be a 
reliable replacement for human workers. There are nascent 
technologies that might enable firms to address some of 
the challenges associated with handling soft materials. Yet 
even with these developments, Crystal Group, the largest 
clothing manufacturer in the world, has expanded produc-
tion in Bangladesh and Viet Nam, with its CEO specifically 
stating that robots could not compete with humans (Bain, 
2018).
Source: Frederick (2018).
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areas include trade policy, trade infrastructure, and labor market 
flexibility.
A country’s trade policy shapes the amount and type of for-
eign investment and, thus, influences the potential of GVC inte-
gration to influence labor markets. Open trade regimes may be 
more likely to attract foreign investors than inward-oriented 
regimes, since they are less constrained by the size and efficiency 
of the local market (Crespo and Fontoura 2007). Foreign investors 
might also be more export-oriented in an open setting, increas-
ing chances for local suppliers to become exporters, too. More-
over, foreign investors in an open trade setting are globally more 
integrated and therefore adopt the newest technologies (Meyer 
and Sinani 2009). Others, however, argue that foreign investors in 
an outward-oriented trade setting might focus more strongly on 
international distribution and marketing, while foreign firms in an 
inward-oriented policy regime might bring newer technologies to 
the host countries (Crespo and Fontoura 2007). 
Connective trade infrastructure, firm capabilities, and devel-
oping standards also influence GVC participation. Improving 
trade facilitation and developing more competitive trade logistics 
sectors to compete effectively in an environment that requires 
seamless importing and exporting are key recommendations for 
strengthening GVC participation (Taglioni and Winkler 2016).
Higher labor market flexibility – in absolute terms as well as rel-
ative to the level in the foreign investor’s home country – is also 
shown to have a positive effect on the chances of securing initial 
foreign investment (Javorcik and Spatareanu 2005).
Second, how GVC participation and labor markets inter-
act can also be influenced by policy. Different structural con-
ditions, endowments, and policies may play a role in mediating 
the trade-labor relationship and fostering the positive spillovers 
that can occur. The literature confirms that education and skills 
influence the share of human capital in firms and are particularly 
important for expanding trade integration and spillovers from 
FDI in developing countries (Farole and Winkler 2014). Meyer and 
Sinani (2009) show evidence that the share of workers with tertiary 
education significantly affects FDI spillovers. This relationship 
takes a U-shaped form, that is, only below or above certain thresh-
old levels of human capital does the extent of spillovers increase 
(Meyer and Sinani 2009). Tytell and Yudaeva (2007) find for Roma-
nia that productivity spillovers from foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in manufacturing are significantly lower in regions with a low share 
of education. Farole and Winkler (2014) confirm for a sample of 
78 low- and middle-income countries that a country’s government 
spending on education as a percentage of GDP has a strongly 
positive productivity effect. Kummritz, Taglioni, and Winkler (2017) 
measure the positive impact of skills building on the value-added 
gains from GVC integration as a seller in a sample of 61 countries. 
A higher expected number of years of schooling (Barro and Lee 
2013), the share of workers with a secondary degree, or higher, 
in the total workforce (WDI 2018), as well as better educational 
quality (WEF 2018) all show positive interaction terms with GVC 
integration.
Trade policy also affects domestic firms. Local firms in an open 
trade regime are more exposed to competitive pressures through 
international trade, which prepares them to better absorb FDI 
spillovers. Overall, studies confirm that FDI spillovers are larger 
in countries that are more open towards trade (Meyer and Sinani 
2009; Du, Harrison, and Jefferson, 2011; Havranek and Irsova 2011).
Labor market regulations may also influence the effect of GVC 
integration on domestic firms through various channels. Labor 
market regulations, and, in particular, wage constraints, can affect 
skills in a firm, and hence their absorptive capacity (Hale and Long 
2011). Overly rigid labor markets can reduce the likelihood of labor 
turnover and GVC spillovers. Conversely, overly flexible labor mar-
kets may generate frequent labor turnover, which reduces the time 
for domestic workers to acquire skills and knowledge from foreign 
firms. Kummritz, Taglioni, and Winkler (2017) find that labor free-
dom tends to increase the value-added gains from GVC integra-
tion as a buyer and seller. Thus, the policy environment can medi-
ate better labor market outcomes from GVC participation.
Third, policies can influence the activities that countries under-
take in GVCs. If the nature of GVC participation matters for the 
types of jobs it supports, then policies can support better types 
of GVC participation. As noted by Shepherd and Stone (2012), 
policies that are designed to help firms — in a non-distortionary 
way — to move through GVCs to positions of higher value added 
are likely to help promote the beneficial labor market effects of 
GVC participation. Education and training, as well as infrastructure 
development, and backbone services sectors can also help firms 
to successfully internationalize in higher value added activities. 
Human capital, for example, may influence the quality and avail-
ability of workers.
However, better conditions for workers within GVCs does not 
necessarily follow from greater GVC participation (Milberg and 
Winkler 2011). Social upgrading can be fostered by labor reg-
ulations, such as those for occupational safety, health and envi-
ronment standards in GVC sites. For example, Hollweg and Kanz 
(2018) use firm-level data from the ILO-IFC Better Work Viet Nam 
program to assess the relationship between transparency on 
working conditions and firm compliance in the apparel sector in 
Viet Nam between 2010 and 2018. The authors find that while 
continued participation in the Better Work Viet Nam program 
has the strongest effect on changes in firm compliance with labor 
standards over time, the public disclosure of firms’ names that fail 
to comply with critical labor issues is also associated with increase 
compliance. The effects are stronger in some compliance points 
including occupational health and safety, work time, and child 
labor.
Fourth, if GVCs tend to be associated with greater inequality 
by increasing the relative demand for skilled labor in develop-
ing countries, then policy has an important role to pay in ensur-
ing that the gains from trade are shared evenly (see Chapter 2). 
Complementary policies are likely to play a vital role. As noted 
by Shepherd and Stone (2012), GVCs could have stronger effects 
on inequality in the absence of education and training policies 
designed to promote workforce and human capital development. 
Well-functioning labor markets are also important, because inte-
grating into GVCs generates faster growth and transformation, 
and require economy-wide adjustment (see Chapter 2).
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7. Conclusions
Today, significant parts of the developing world are deeply 
involved in GVCs. The unbundling of production is expected to 
have significant implications for labor markets – where jobs go, 
who gets them, and what type of jobs they are (Farole 2015). The 
labor market impacts of GVC participation, as well as the impact 
that future megatrends will have on labor markets, are a principal 
concern to policymakers in developing countries.
The chapter focused on nationwide implications of GVC inte-
gration for workers in developing countries, from the perspec-
tive of nationwide jobs and wages, nationwide spillovers, and the 
relative demand for skilled versus unskilled labor. It also analyzed 
the potential implications of new technologies for GVCs from the 
perspective of labor markets.
The chapter showed that, while GVC participation has been 
important for jobs and wages, it also has had distributional con-
sequences for where jobs go and the types of jobs available. 
GVC integration has supported jobs and earnings, as well as 
other development impacts that operate through labor mar-
kets. Job and wage gains have been achieved not only within the 
exporting sector, but indirectly through linkages of exporting 
firms to domestic, input-supplying firms. Employment and wage 
gains have been biased towards more skilled workers, which 
contrasts with the predictions of trade theory. The skill-biased 
nature of GVC trade is also associated with increased complexity 
of global supply chains as well as increased use of skill-intensive 
inputs, notably services. New emerging trends, including auto-
mation and digitization, may further determine how developing 
countries will be affected by GVC trade in the future.
Policies also play an important role in mediating the relation-
ship between GVCs and employment in developing countries. 
These include policies that support (i) participation of develop-
ing countries in GVCs, (ii) fostering positive spillovers from GVC 
participation, (iii) upgrading to higher value-added tasks within 
GVCs, and (iv) mediating negative effects from winners, such as 
skilled versus unskilled labor.
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Notes
1. Note that the estimates are likely upward biased as exporting firms in 
particular are likely to have higher import content than non-exporting 
firms and higher productivity and current input-output based tables 
are not able to differentiate between the two.
2. Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, 
Mongolia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, and 
Viet Nam.
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